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Sexual Preference: Recognizing the Shared Vulnerability
Because there is a growing interest in legal rights for gay per-
sons, courts will soon be force to address this important issue
head on. Courts will have to decide whether sexual orientation
meets the requirements of a suspect classification. This article
aspires to provide guidance for courts that can no longer side-
step the question of whether sexual orientation is a suspect clas-
sification. The analysis compares race and sexual orientation,
examining the thinking process whereby race and sexual orien-
tation share the vulnerability associated with the human attrib-
utes that the requirements of a suspect classification are
expected to meet.
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The U.S. Constitution upholds multiple values, including
justice, efficiency, and liberty, as well as the interests that are
integral to those values. For example, when courts conclude that
race is an attribute that deserves the protection we offer to
vulnerable members of our community, they do so because of
the intrinsic unfairness implicit in permitting a citizen to
experience disparate treatment as a result of characteristics over
which they lack discretion. However, the apparent justice in
such a judgment conflicts with individualism, arguably the
central value of American life.
The American legal system's theory of responsibility is
decidedly individualistic, rooted in the ideas of John Locke and
an individualistic American culture.Indvidualism, as the term is
used here, refers to the assumption that humans do and should
make decisions that determine the course of their life. Emerging
from this assumption is an emphasis on individual responsibility
as an expectation and prescription. Individual responsibility
produces rulings that hold individuals accountable for what are
considered to be the reasonable effects of their decisions.
Individualism, refers to the belief that the individual is
responsible for his or her own condition, whether comfortable
or miserable.' In America, there is a unique fascination with
individualism and the emphasis on rational determination of the
1 Peter Schuck, Understanding America - A Commentary by Peter Schuck,
YALE LAw SCHOOL (MAY 8, 2008) http://www.1aw.yale.edu/news/6883.htm.
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course of ones life that it encourages. The presumption of
individuals' capability to order their world results in a
generalized hesitancy to "harm" citizens by extending
compassionate assistance to them.2
In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville labeled what
he observed in America as "individualism." Tocqueville argues
that American individualists are often blind to the organic needs
of society. Because American's hold themselves responsible for
their own destiny, they attribute their individual responsibility
model onto others. This attribution ensures that everyone is
held responsible for their own actions, be they laudable or
morally reprehensible.3
Examining the moral reasoning and decision making of
American children further highlights the extensive reach of
American individualism. In a study of Filipino and American
children, Alison Carson and Ali Banuazizi found that American
children's resource allocation decisions were likely to be based
on merit as opposed to need.4 Regardless of the type of need
2 See M. Neil Browne & Michael D. Meuti, Individualism and the Markey
Determination of Women's Wages in the United States, Canada and Hong
Kong, 21 Loy. L.A. Iwr'L & COMP. L.REv. 355, 357 (1999).
3 See M. Neil Browne & Nancy. K. Kubasek, A Communitarian Green Space
Between Market and Political Rhetoric About Environmental Law, 37 AM.
BUS. L. J.127, 168-169 (1999); But see BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE
MYTHOF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM (1994) (arguing that although
American individualism does exist, the extent of its impact upon American
culture has been greatly exaggerated. He references the Protestant's
rampant distrust of the radical individual, as well as their strong focus on the
community and social cohesion to point out that America was not founded
on the value of individual responsibility. Moreover, Shain highlights the civic
republican tradition our founding fathers built our nation upon to illustrate
another case where the individual is deemphasized in favor of the collective
good.).
4 See Alison S. Carson & Ali Banuazizi, "That's Not Fair" - Similarities and
differences in distributive justice reasoning between American and Filipino
children, J. OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCH. ., 39(4), 493-514 (2008). In an
effort to examine the relationship between cultural norms and resource
distribution among 151 Filipino (generally collectivist) and American
(generally considered individualistic) fifth graders, Carson and Banuazizi
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expressed, the child awarding the resources was more likely to
choose the individual who had worked hardest (and/or met the
goal). From a very early age, American children are taught that
individuals should be responsible for themselves.
In Romer v. Evans,5 the Court addressed the constitutionality
of Colorado's Amendment 2 with pervasive individualism
serving as an undercurrent. 6 This amendment, approved by a
voter referendum, barred any state action that protected
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals from discrimination.7 It further
repealed various city ordinances that prohibited sexual
orientation discrimination.8 The court explicitly avoided the
issue of whether sexual orientation deserves heightened scrutiny
developed two scenarios. The scenarios each contained a child who had done
a great amount of work and a child who had great need. The children were
asked to determine how a reward should be distributed. Although the
Filipino and American children both favored equality based distributions
first, the American children were more likely to make their decision based on
equity (37.9% in first scenario and 23.0% in the second). The Filipino
children were more likely to make their decision based on need (47.9% in the
first scenario and 42.3% in the second). The Filipino children were more
likely than their American counterparts to consider the outcomes associated
with their allocation recommendation. Negative feelings and potential
conflict (which this author attributes to cultural norms emphasizing the need
to maintain smooth interpersonal relations) were mentioned by the majority
of Filipino participants. The American participants did not concern
themselves with the relational outcomes.
5 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
6 Id. at 624. The amendment provided:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or
Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through
any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies,
political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise
be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have
or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected
status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 In avoiding this issue, the Court held that the
proposed amendment failed to pass constitutional muster even
under rational basis review.10 In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court
held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution
violated the equal protection clause. The amendment had
denied homosexual and bisexual persons the right to seek and
receive specific legal protection from discrimination. Justice
Kennedy indicated that a law can be upheld under the equal
protection clause, even if it seems to disadvantage a specific
group, so long as it can be shown to "advance a legitimate
government interest." Amendment 2, by depriving persons of
equal protection under the law due to their sexual orientation
failed to advance such a legitimate interest.
The Romer decision, however, was not the first instance in
which the Court has avoided determining the level of review for
homosexuals." In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court had to
determine the constitutionality of sodomy laws that the Court
had upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick.12 Instead of deciding
whether or not sexual orientation is a suspect class or the level
of review gay persons would be provided in equal protection
lawsuits, the Court in Lawrence completely side-stepped the
equal protection issue.13 In ignoring the equal protection issue,
9 Id. at 632.
10 Id. The Court stated,
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group,
an exceptional and . . . invalid form of legislation. Second, its
sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it
that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests.
11 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003.
13 Id. at 578-79. The Court held that the victims in the case were entitled to
be respected for their private lives. Id. at 578. The State cannot demean the
victims' existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
Volume 6, Number I
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the Court in Lawrence decided the case on substantive due
process grounds, holding that the sodomy laws
unconstitutionally imposed on sexual privacy.14
While the Romer and Lawrence decisions failed to directly
address the issue of whether sexual orientation is a suspect class
requiring laws that discriminate against homosexuals to be
subjected to heightened scrutiny,15 subsequent petitions before
the United States Supreme Court asked the high court to
determine the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act, which defines marriage, for purposes of federal
law, as a legal union between a man and a woman.16 If the
court agrees to hear any of these cases, the level of scrutiny to
be applied to laws discriminating against homosexuals should be
a central issue in the case. Because there is a growing interest in
legal rights for gay persons, courts will soon be forced to address
this important issue head on.'7 Courts will have to decide
whether sexual orientation meets the requirements of a suspect
classification.18
conduct criminal. Id. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
endows the victims with the full right to engage in their conduct without
interference from the government. Id.
14 Id. at 578. The Court noted that the Constitution promises that there is a
realm of personal liberty in which the government may not enter. Id.
15 Unlike Lawrence, the Romer Court decided the case on equal protection
grounds. . In Romer, the Court, however, determined that the amendment
that was at issue was so irrational because it stripped homosexuals of all
protections. Id. The Court held that the state could not even pass the most
lenient rational basis review. Id.
16 Robyn Hagan Cain, And Then There Were Seven: Court Receives Another
Gay Marriage Case, FINDLAW LEGAL BLOGs (Aug. 27, 2012, 3:14 PM), http://
blogs.findlaw.com/supreme-court/2012/08/and-then-there-were-7-court-
receives-another-gay-marriage-case.html?DCMP=NWL-conslegalgrounds.
17 Kari Balog, Equal Protection for Homosexuals: Why the Immutability
Argument is Necessary and How it is Met, 53 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 545, 553
(2005-2006).
18 Id. As of yet, the Court has refused to recognize homosexuals as a suspect
classification. The time has come when the Court can no longer avoid
deciding the issue.
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This article aspires to provide guidance for courts that can no
longer side-step the question of whether sexual orientation is a
suspect classification. The analysis compares race and sexual
orientation by examining their similar human attributes that
require suspect classification protections.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the Equal
Protection Clause. This part is followed by an explication of
suspect classes, indicating the requirements of a suspect class
and a brief review of the groups currently recognized as such.
Part III of this article will demonstrate how sexual orientation
meets the requirements of a suspect class. Part IV examines
equal protection of homosexuality under Canada's Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Part V concludes that laws that
discriminate against homosexuals should be held to the same
strict scrutiny as laws that discriminate on the basis of race.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION PRIMER
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution holds that no state shall de-
prive any person of the equal protection of the laws.19 This
amendment requires that similarly situated people should be
treated alike.20 By adhering to this mandate, the United States
Supreme Court has found that the Equal Protection Clause was
enacted to guarantee nothing less than abolition of all cast and
invidious class-based legislation.21 To achieve this end, the court
has developed a three-tiered hierarchy of equal protection re-
view to determine whether a governmental purpose is adequate
to justify use of the discriminatory classification in question.22
19 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.
20 Plyler V. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
21 Id. at 213.
22 Watkins v. U. S. Army, 885 F. 2d 699, 712 (9th Cir. 1989).
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The first standard of review, and the most deferential, is ra-
tional basis.23 Rational basis review requires the party challeng-
ing the statute to bear the burden of proof. 4 Under this
standard, legislative enactments enjoy a presumption of consti-
tutionality as long as the classification is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.25 Rational basis review applies to legis-
lative enactments relating to nearly all economic and commer-
cial legislation.26
Under rational basis scrutiny, a court determines whether the
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in connection to
the purpose of the statute.27 By requiring a nexus between the
classifications and the legislative purpose, courts ensure that the
purpose of the classification is not to burden the disadvantaged
groups. 28 This relationship does not have to be demonstrated
with precise certainty but should not be so attenuated as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.29
The second standard of review is intermediate scrutiny.3o
Legislation implicating a quasi-suspect classification is subject to
this level of review, essentially requiring that the legislation be
substantially related to an important governmental interest.31
Gender and legitimacy are two recognizable quasi-suspect
classifications.32
23 Richard Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact
of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky. L. J. 591, 603 (1999-2000).
24 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1992).
25 Mass. Bd. Of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
26 U.S. R. R. Ret. Bd. V. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175-77 (1980).
27 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
28 Fritz, 449 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J. concurring).
29 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
30 Justin Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under the
United States v. Virginia's "Exceedingly Persuasive Justification" Standard, 86
Cal. L. Rev. 1169, 1173 (1998).
31 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); Clark v. Jeter,
486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Legitimacy refers to a child born within a marriage.
Katherine Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents:
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The Supreme Court has never explained why certain factors
are significant in determining what classes are deserving of
quasi-suspect status.33 Courts have considered the following fac-
tors in determining whether a class is deserving of quasi-suspect
status: (1) discrete and insular minority,34 (2) immutability,3 5 (3)
stereotypes and stigmas,36 and (4) political powerlessness37
Courts are willing to extend additional protection than rational
basis review when it is evident that a group would suffer dis-
crimination and would be unlikely to overcome such discrimina-
tion.38 This additional protection is classifying certain groups as
quasi-suspect.
Intermediate scrutiny shifts the burden of proof from the
party challenging the legislative enactment to the government.39
The government bears the burden of proof because courts are
better able to determine whether legislative enactments are
based in animus directed at a particular group.40
Challenging the Three Pillars of Exclusion-Legitimacy, Dual-Gender Parent-
ing, and Biology, 28 Law & Ineq. 307, 316 (2010).
33 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1988).
34 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 n. 4 (1938).
3s Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
36 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
37 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
38 See supra notes 35-38.
39 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688
40 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The Court in Cleburne stated,
The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest. The general rule
gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage,
or national origin. These factors are so seldom relevant to the
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded
in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and an-
tipathy - a view that those in the class are not as worthy or
deserving as others. For these reasons ... these laws are sub-
jected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are
suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Id. This judicial oversight is necessary when discrimination is unlikely to be
timely resolved by legislative means. Id.
Volume 6, Number I
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The third standard of review is strict scrutiny.41 Government
acts implicating a suspect classification or explicitly burdening a
fundamental right are subject to strict judicial scrutiny and must
be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental inter-
est.4 2 For this standard, the government bears the burden of
proof.43 In justifying strict scrutiny, the Court in Plyler held,
Some classifications are more likely than others to
reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legisla-
tive rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objec-
tive. Legislation predicated on such prejudice is
easily recognized as incompatible with the consti-
tutional understanding that each person is to be
judged individually and is entitled to equal justice
under the law. Classifications treated as suspect
tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative
goal.44
Under the Equal Protection Clause, courts apply some height-
ened level of scrutiny where there are reasons to suspect
prejudice against a discrete and insular minority, which tends to
limit the operation of those political processes to be relied upon
to protect minorities.45 Courts apply a high level of scrutiny be-
cause there is a presumption that classifications that burden
some politically powerless groups are likely to reflect antipathy
41 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 1267,
1277 (2007).
42 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Certain classifications
are presumptively not permitted on the ground that they are illegitimate.
Nelson Tibbe and Deborah Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1375, 1407 (2010). Because these classifications are presump-
tively disallowed, they must be justified by the state with doubts and ambigui-
ties resolved against the government. Id. Race, national origin, and alienage
are among the classifications that must be justified by a compelling state in-
terest under the strict scrutiny standard of review. Id.
43 Cleburne, 411 U.S. at 440.
44 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n. 14 (1982).
45 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
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against such groups and that such classifications are inherently
suspect. Thus they require being strict scrutiny. .46 John Hart
Ely noted that the doctrine of suspect classifications is a way of
revealing official attempts to impose inequality for its own
sake.47 The concept of suspect classification is also a way to un-
cover official attempts to treat a particular group worse not in
the service of overriding social goals but for the sake of simply
disadvantaging its members.48
IH. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE INDICIA OF SUSPECT
CLASSIFICATION STATUS
The Supreme Court has recognized race,49 alienage, 50 and na-
tional origin5' as suspect classifications. In this paper, we will
argue that sexual orientation deserves inclusion in this list. This
section will demonstrate how sexual orientation meets the crite-
ria for determining whether a group is suspect. First we discuss
46 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n. 14 (1982). Courts will view certain
classifications "with skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye" in part because cer-
tain classifications are likely to be the result of animus rather than a desire to
promote legitimate state goals, and in part because the normal correction
mechanism within the political process may not operate fairly when these
groups are involved. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S.
863, 873 (1994).
47 Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 481, 502-03
(2004) (quoting John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 153 (1980)).
48 Id.
49 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The court ruled that
racial classifications are inherently suspect and subject to the most rigid scru-
tiny. Id. at 216.
50 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The court held that classifica-
tions based on alienage are immediately suspect because noncitizens are a
perfect example of a discrete and insular minority for whom heightened judi-
cial care is warranted. Id. at 372.
51 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). The court found that
classifications on the basis of ancestry or national origin, similar to race, are
inherently suspect. Id. at 100. Although in dicta, religion has been included
in the list of suspect classifications. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam).
Volume 6, Number I
71
RACE AND SEXLUAL PREFERENCE
fall zo01z
11
Kubasek et al.: The Analogous Constitutional Protection of Race and Sexual Prefer
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice
the appropriateness of race as analogous due to the immutabil-
ity of race and sexual orientation. Then we will independently
discuss each factor that the courts use to determine whether a
class is suspect and show how sexual orientation fulfills each
element.
We argue that race provides an appropriate basis for compari-
son because both race and sexual orientation are immutable
characteristics.52 Alienage, is less relevant as a comparator be-
cause alienage is not an immutable53 trait, although arguably it
meets all the other indicia of being a suspect classification. 54
52 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1976) (holding that race is an
immutable characteristic). See also Equality Found. Of Greater Cincinnati v.
City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1994), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 943 (1998). In this case, the court relied on credible and unrebutted
evidence concluding that sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic
that is beyond the individual's control. Id. Various state courts have deter-
mined that sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic resulting in these
courts using a heightened level of review. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W. 2d 862, 892 (Iowa 2009). See also Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The
Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 Colum. L. Rev.
1753, 1831 (1996). The pro-gay position that homosexuality is immutable is
based on scientific studies concluding that there are important differences
between the brains of homosexuals and heterosexuals. Id. Courtney Powers,
Finding LGB TS a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power of LGBTS as a
Basis for the Court's Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 Duke J. Gender
L. & Pol'y 385, 389 (2010). Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination
Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 471, 480-81 (2001).
Scholars argue that sexual orientation is not chosen. Id. This argument is
made because people should not be punished for something that they have
no control over. Id. Scholars who support this argument rely on scientific
research showing that sexual orientation is innate or biologically determined.
Id.
53 An immutable trait is one that is unchangeable. Strictly speaking, alien-
age is not an immutable characteristic because one can always become a citi-
zen. THOMAS, SIMON, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE: LAW, POLITICS
AND PHILOSOPHY, at 7 (1995)
54 See, e.g., Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.W. 1997)
(holding that alienage is not an immutable characteristic); Smothers v. Beni-
tez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 306 n. 10 (D.P.R. 1992). The court noted that alienage
is not immutable because aliens can become citizens. Id. Assuming, argu-
endo, that religion is a suspect classification, religion is not analogous to sexual
Volume 6, Number Ia
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RACE AND SEXUAL PREFERENCE
However, some scholars do argue that race does not provide this
basis for comparison because sexual orientation is a mutable
characteristic.55 These scholars adopt the view that sexual orien-
tation is a choice.56
orientation because the former is a mutable characteristic. Kenji Yoshino, As-
similationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the
Case of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, 108 Yale L. J. 485, 495 (1998). Courts are
reluctant to grant religious classification heightened scrutiny because religious
discrimination cases have traditionally been decided under the First Amend-
ment. Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Note: Religious-Based Preemptory Challenges
After Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and
First Amendment Analysis, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 191, 204 (1995).
5s See, e.g., Devon Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47
UCLA L. Rev. 1467, 1480 (2000). John Butler, perhaps the most distin-
guished black American military sociologist, espoused the view that race is a
static identity and that sexual orientation is a changeable lifestyle. Id. at 1479.
Butler argued that the comparison between sexual orientation and race is
tantamount to comparing a characteristic that is achieved with one that is
ascribed or comparing a choice in expressed lifestyle with one that is not a
choice. Id. at 1481. Dean Byrd, Homosexuality: Innate or Immutable?, 14
Regent U. L. Rev. 383, 388 (2001-2012). Simon Levay, who found subtle but
important differences between the brains of homosexual men and heterosex-
ual men, stressed that he did not prove that homosexuality is genetic or find a
genetic cause for being gay. Id. Levay also noted that he did not prove that
gay men are born gay. Id. J. M. Bailey and R. C. Pillard conducted another
studied concluding that environmental factors significantly contribute to sex-
ual orientation. Id. at 390. Lynn D. Wardle, The Biological Causes and Con-
sequences of Homosexual Behavior and their Relevance for Family Law
Policies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 997, 1001 (2007). Dean Hamer, the author of
the "Gay Gene" study, noted that homosexuality is not purely genetic and
environmental factors play a role. Id. Hammer further explained that there
is not a single gene that makes people gay. Id.
56 See, e.g., Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A
Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 517
(1994). Former Vice President Dan Quayle became the most notable propo-
nent of this view during the 1992 presidential campaign. Id. Quayle an-
nounced, My viewpoint is that it's more of a choice than a biological
situation. I think it is a wrong choice." Id. Larry Mutz, A Fairy Tale: The
Myth of the Homosexual Lifestyle in Anti-Gay-and-Lesbian Rhetoric, 27
WOMEN'S RTs. L. Ri-r. 69, 79 (2006). Anti-gay activists assert that homosex-
uality is a chosen lifestyle. Id. This assertion assumes that homosexuality is
not a sexual orientation. Id. This assertion further assumes that homosexual-
ity is a lifestyle constituted of sexual acts. Id.
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The debate surrounding immutability of sexual preferences is
crucial for this discussion. Should someone relying on the tradi-
tional meme of individualism conclude that sexual preference is
a choice, it follows that the consequences of that choice are
themselves the responsibility of the chooser. But claiming that
sexual preference is a choice is incorrect for multiple reasons.
The first reason is extensive evidence that sexual orientation is
genetic, biological, and inherent.57 Secondly, even if sexual ori-
entation is not genetic, for purposes of constitutional law, homo-
sexuality is an immutable characteristic because it cannot be
changed without involving substantial difficulty or cost.58 For
gays and lesbians to change or be forced to change their orienta-
57 Jonathan Pickhardt, Choose or Lose: Embracing Theories of Choice in
Gay Rights Litigation Strategies, 73 N. Y. U. L. REV. 921, 930 (1998). Scien-
tist Dean Hamer noted that he was 99.5 percent sure that there was some
genetic influence in forming sexual orientation. Id. Kari Balog, Equal Pro-
tection for Homosexuals: Why the Immutable Argument is Necessary and Why
It Is Met, 53 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 545, 560 (2005-2006). Doctors and scientists
recognize that sexual orientation is not subject to change and is most likely
determined at birth. Id. Although these doctors and scientists have not prove
that there is a definitive cause for homosexuality, they nevertheless conclude
that homosexuality is beyond an individual's control and that it is unlikely to
change. Id. While there is no definitive proof that homosexuality is com-
pletely genetic, there is, however, no definitive proof that homosexuality is
the result of social factors. Id. at 557. Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet:
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA
L. REV. 915, 938 (1989). Alan Bell, Martin Weinburg, and Sue Kiefer Ham-
mersmith concluded that when boys and girls reach adolescence, these boys'
and girls' sexual orientation is likely to already be determined. Id. Bell,
Weinburg, and Hammersmith argue that such a conclusion would reaffirm
that discrimination against homosexuals is no more justified than discrimina-
tion against redheads or blue-eyed persons. Id.
58 Fernando Gutierrez, Gay and Lesbian: An Ethnic Identity Deserving
Equal Protection, 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 195, 222 (1994). A trait is considered
immutable if to change the trait would be a great psychological, economic, or
social cost to the individual. Id. Even gender is not completely immutable.
Id. The reason is women can pay a significant amount of money to receive a
sex change. Id. Stephen Zamansky, Colorado's Amendment 2 and Homosex-
uals' Right to Equal Protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REV. 221, 228 (1998).
Immutable does not mean the literal definition of immutability. Id.
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tion would be at an immense psychological cost.59 Lastly, sexual
orientation is immutable because it is so integral to a person's
identity that it would be unreasonable for the government to
penalize a person for refusing to change. 60
The immutability element, however, is but one factor courts
look at in determining whether a class is suspect.61 Other fac-
tors courts consider in granting suspect status are: (1) whether
the group is a discrete and insular minority,62 (2) whether the
group has been subjected to historical discrimination, 63 (3)
whether the group has faced social stigmatization,64 (4) whether
the group is politically powerless,65 and (5) whether the trait has
any connection to the individual's ability to contribute to
society.66
A. Discrete and Insular Minority
It is imperative to first note that there is no commonly ac-
cepted definition of the terms "discrete" and "insular."67 Pro-
fessor Bruce Ackerman, however, provided the most widely
accepted explanation for the terms "discrete and insular" minor-
59 Id.
60 Zamansky, supra note 52 , at 252. Michael Helfand, The Usual Suspect
Classifications: Criminals, Aliens, and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 6-7 (2009). See also Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health,
957 A. 2d 407, 438 (Conn. 2008).
61 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
62 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n. 4 (1938).
63 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85.
64 Id.
65 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. . Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
66 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1976).
67 Sarona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L.
REV. 1213, 1235 (2003). See also Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classi-
fications, 35 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 135, 148-49 (2011). In early cases, courts
conclusorily stated that a particular group was or was not discrete and insu-
lar. Id. Because courts failed to define these terms, it is unclear what must be
established for a court to consider a group discrete and insular. Id. at 149.
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ity.68 Professor Ackerman defined discreteness as a visible char-
acteristic. 69 That is, a group is discrete if it is visible in a way
that makes the group relatively easy for others to identify.70 A
group is insular if it tends to interact with other members of the
group with great frequency in a variety of social contexts.71
Race is a discrete minority because racial minorities exhibit
visible and identifiable characteristics. 72 Skin color is an imme-
diately obvious and permanent characteristic present at birth.73
African-American individuals, for example, are perceived as
such based on their skin color.74 Even if they wanted to, many
blacks could not pass for white because their physiognomies
proclaim them to be black in a society that has given that label
to people containing certain characteristics.75
Sexual orientation is also a discrete minority because gay peo-
ple have distinguishing and obvious characteristics classifying
them as a distinct group.76 Although gay people are identifiable,
68 Strauss, Id. at 149.
69 Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 729
(1985).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 726. This definition includes two concepts. Id. at 726 n. 24. The first
concept is breadth involving the number of different sociological settings in
which a particular group interacts. Id. In this respect, a group is more insular
because it interacts in more settings. Id. Some of these settings are (1)
schools, (2) churches, and (3) unions. Id. The second concept is intensity
involving the importance group members associate with these social settings.
Id.
72 Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination
by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1211 (2004).
73 Randall Kennedy, Marriage and the Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black
Liberation, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 781, 793 (2005).
74 Id. at 794.
75 Id.
76 Janine Dascenzo and Neal May, Cleaning Out the Pentagon's Closet: An
Overview of the Defense Department's Anti-Gay Policy, 23 U. TOL. L. REV.
433, 460 (1992). See Marc Fajer, A Better Analogy: "Jews," "Homosexuals,"
and the Inclusion of Sexual Orientation as a Forbidden Characteristic in An-
tidiscrimination Laws, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 37, 40 (2001). See Marc
Fajer, A Better Analogy: "Jews" and "Homosexuals," and the Inclusion of
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they are coerced to conceal their status to avoid discrimina-
tion.77 Many gay people are afraid to disclose their sexual dif-
ferences to a society that labels their behavior unacceptable.78
Scholars argue that race does not provide a basis for compari-
son because race is a visible characteristic.79 Specifically, schol-
Sexual Orientatuin as a Forbidden Characteristic in Antidiscrimination Laws,
12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 37, 40 (2110)
77 John Charles Hayes, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of
Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. REV. 375, 377 (1990). Homosexuals are subjected
to a vast array of official and unofficial discrimination that affect every aspect
of their lives. Id. The ramifications of a gay person identifying himself or
herself as a gay person are so severe and pervasive that he or she is forced to
conceal his or her identity as a homosexual. Id. Discrimination against
homosexuals has a long history. Id. This discrimination is actively promoted
by state and federal governments in such areas as public employment and
family law. Id.
78 Jack Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First
Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCER
L. REV. 189, 202 (1999). A majority of Americans believe that homosexual-
ity is morally repugnant. Id. A minority of this number believe that homo-
sexuality should be criminalized. Id. Opinion seems to vary among racial and
ethnic groups. Id. at 202 n. 34. In a poll of 1000 Californians, 64% of Latino
respondents thought homosexuality was morally repugnant as compared to
58% of black respondents and 36% of white respondents. Id. See also
Charles Butler, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress's Use of Narrative in
the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 853 n. 59 (1998).
Today and particularly in the past, the most common view of homosexuality
is that it is an aberration and homosexual behavior is morally wrong. Id.
79 Kennedy, supra note 67, at 793. These scholars argue that race and sexual
orientation are not similar because race is an unchangeable characteristic
that is visible. Id. In contrast, sexual orientation is a matter of chosen behav-
ior that can be hidden. Id. These scholars further argue that skin color is an
immediately visible characteristic. Id. Sexual orientation, on the other hand,
is not. Id. That is, people do not know if a person is gay unless that person
discloses that information. Id. African Americans, for example, do not have
this same option. Id. See also Jane Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in
the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 283, 294 (1994). Sexual orientation is different from race because sex-
ual orientation is both chosen and behavior. Id. Because sexual orientation is
chosen, it is beyond the pale of civil rights protection. Id. Homosexuals are
not entitled to civil rights protection because civil rights laws protect people
for who they are and not for what they do. Id.
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ars argue that gay people have a choice not to reveal their
sexual orientation.80 Racial minorities, however, do not have
this same choice because race is usually revealed by appear-
ance. 81 Because gay people have a choice not to disclose their
sexuality, they can avoid discrimination in a way that most racial
minorities cannot.82 This proposition ignores the fact that race
can be visibly hidden, it is somewhat susceptible to change, and
it is sometimes culturally determined.83 That is, race is not al-
ways visibly clear. For example, miscegenation statutes claimed
"one drop" made a person African American, but the one drop
was not always ascertainable. 84 Although their blood would
classify them as otherwise, African Americans have "passed" as
white.85
Race is an insular minority because there are many settings
that are vital sources of affirming the identity of racial minori-
80 Ackerman, supra note 63, at 729. Gay people have the choice to keep
their sexual orientation a private affair avoiding the public opprobrium at-
tached to their minority status. Id. It is for this reason Ackerman considers
homosexuals, and groups like them, anonymous minorities. Id.
81 Id. For instance, a black woman cannot do anything to hide the fact that
she is a black woman. Id. Because a black woman cannot conceal the obvi-
ous fact that she is a black woman, she will have to deal with the social expec-
tations and stereotypes caused by her evident group characteristics. Id.
82 Comment, Homosexuals' Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test and a Leg-
islative Solution, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 193, 204 (1979).
83 Kari Balog, Equal Protection for Homosexuals: Why the Immutability Ar-
gument is Necessary and How it is Met, 53 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 545, 555 (2005-
06).
84 Id. at 555 n. 77.
85 Id. See also Frank Wu, From Black to White and Back Again, 3 ASIAN L.
J. 185, 186 (1996) ( noting that race is a social construct rather than being a
scientific reality). See Kennedy, supra note 67 at 794. Walter White, an exec-
utive secretary of the NAACP, described himself as a "voluntary negro" be-
cause his appearance allowed him to pass as a white man. Id. Gregory
William Howard, the current president of the City College of New York, de-
scribed how his father had the ability to live as a black man and as a white
man because of the father's outward appearance. Id. Howard also described
how he lived on both sides of the race line. Id.
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ties.86 There is a litany of interest groups that cater to the needs
of racial minorities.87 Some of these groups are: National Con-
ference of Black Mayors; national civil rights organizations; Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People;
Congressional Black Caucus; Mexican American Legal Defense
and Education Fund; Puerto Rican Defense Fund; and Black
Women Organized for Political Action.88 Irrespective of these
groups, racial minorities interact with other racial minorities
with great frequency,89 especially because white and black
Americans often still live apart from each other.90
Commentators argue that gay people do not arise to the same
level of insularity as do racial minorities.91 The proffered reason
is that gay people have a few social contexts that serve as the
center of activity for reaffirmation of gay identities.92 These
contexts that serve as loci for the reaffirmation of gay identity
86 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). See
also Abner S. Green, Kiryas Joen and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 58 (1996) ( noting that the court increased judicial review
in order to protect racial minorities as they constitute a discrete and insular
minority).
87 Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholar-
ship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2244 n. 29 (1992).
88 Id.
89 Michael Potter, Racial Diversity in Residential Communities: Societal
Housing Patterns and a Proposal for a "Racial Inclusionary Ordi-
nance"DDD, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1165 (1990). Statistics demonstrate
that a majority of blacks rarely interact with whites, live in predominantly
black neighborhoods, and socialize with only black residents. Id. In this
country, blacks are the most spacially isolated racial group. Id.
90 Vivian Morris and Curtis Morris, Before Brown, After Brown: What has
Changed for African-American Children?, 16 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 215,
223 (2005).
91 Ackerman, supra note 63, at 729. Sexual orientation differs from race be-
cause the former is somewhat insular where the latter is insular. Id. Homo-
sexuals are somewhat insular because they do not share a broad range of
social settings in which they interact as homosexuals. Id. at 729 n. 28.
92 Id. at 729 n. 28.
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are most notably bars and restaurants found in major American
cities.93
Gay people, however, are also insular because they have a
broad range of sociological settings that are important sources
of reaffirming gay identity.94 In the 1980s, especially in major
cities, the range of sources of gay networking clearly went be-
yond the gay bars and restaurants that were once the only public
meeting places for gay persons.95 National publications such as
Gayellow Pages noted the massive growth of gay-affiliated polit-
ical organizations.96 Gayellow Pages also evidenced the huge
growth of gay-affiliated counseling centers, businesses, lawyers,
public accommodations, and health care, religious, educational,
and entertainment services.97 These affiliations support the con-
cept of "gay minority."98
Alternatively, courts consider several factors in determining
whether a group constitutes a discrete and insular minority de-
serving the benefit of heightened scrutiny. 99 These factors in-
clude: (1) whether the group's defining characteristic is
immutable, (2) whether the group has suffered a history of dis-
crimination, (3) whether the group is in a position of political
powerlessness, (4) whether the group's defining characteristic
relates in any way to the individual's ability to participate in and
contribute to society, and (5) whether the characteristic is be-
93 Id.
94 Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual
Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 263,
276 (1992).
95 Id. at 276 n. 115.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See, e.g., Michael Scaperlanda, Illusions of Liberty and Equality: An
"Alien's" View of Tiered Scrutiny, Governmental Power, and Judicial Imperi-
alism, 55 CATH. U. L. REv. 5, 26 (2005) ( noting that to determine whether a
group is a discrete and insular minority, courts must consider whether the
group suffered a history of discrimination, lacks political power, and has an
immutable characteristic); Hoffman, supra note 61, at 1235.
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yond the control of the individual group member. 00 As dis-
cussed below, gay people and racial minorities are discrete and
insular minorities because both gays and racial minorities are
able to satisfy the foregoing factors.
B. History of Discrimination
It is axiomatic that racial minorities have been subjected to a
history of discrimination. 101 This discrimination was evident in
the institution of slavery, which stripped Black Americans of all
their human, civil, political, and social rights.102 One can never
forget the huge amount of lynching that occurred in the south. 03
The landmark case of Dred Scott v. SanfordO4 held that even
if Blacks were "free," they were not "citizens" of the United
States. 0 5 This ruling was not overturned until the passage of the
Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Amendments in 1865 and 1868
respectively.106 These amendments emancipated Blacks, ex-
pressly granted them citizenship status, and sought to protect
their civil rights. 07 It was not until 1870 when blacks were ex-
tended the political rights of citizenship through the passage of
the Fifteenth Amendment, which gave them the right to vote. 08
100 Id.
101 Ian F. Haney Lopez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reac-
tionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1021 (2007).
102 Sandra Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination: A Historical Case for
Equal Treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 89, 89 (1994).
103 R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in
Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 863 (2004).
104 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
105 Id. at 416.
106 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
107 The thirteenth Amendment abolished the institution of slavery. Id. It
was the Fourteenth Amendment that granted former slaves citizenship. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. This amendment also guaranteed these former slaves
due process of the law and equal protection of the laws. Id.
108 U.S. CONsT. amend. XV. Beginning in the colonial times, and the first
one hundred years of this nation's independent, blacks were precluded from
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Despite the fact that blacks were endowed with certain rights
as citizens, they endured years of racism and segregation due to
laws mandating segregation passed in the late 1880s and
1890s.109 The Supreme Court affirmed one of these laws in the
case of Plessy v. Ferguson."0 The law in Plessy was a Louisiana
statute requiring separate railway cars for blacks and whites."'
The court in Plessy established the "separate but equal" rule to
justify segregation.112
Without much judicial resistance, state legislative bodies con-
tinued to enact a slew of race-based laws."1s The preclusion of
individuals based on race remained uncontested until Kore-
matsu v. United States.114 After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a Japanese American
for violating a civilian exclusion order.15 This order mandated
the exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from a desig-
nated military area.116
voting. Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehen-
sive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 56-57 (2000). Even most free blacks were excluded from suffrage before
the Civil War. Id. at 57. In the United States, voting discrimination was not
limited to a particular region. Id. For the blacks who were able to vote, their
votes were rendered ineffective. Id. That is, there was racial gerrymandering
that diluted these votes. Id. Blacks were also excluded from voting with the
adoption of poll taxes and literary tests. Id. at 58-59.
109 Brandon Robinson, Johnson v. California: A Grayer Shade of Brown, 56
DuKE L. J. 343, 349 (2006).
110 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
111 Id. at 542.
112 Id. at 544.
113 See, e.g., Berea Coll. V. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908). In this case,
the court upheld a trial conviction of a college because this college violated a
state statute by admitting both black and white students. Id. McCabe v.
Atchison, 186 F. 966, 969 (8th Cir. 1911) (upholding an Oklahoma statute
mandating racial segregation of railway cars); Hayes v. Crutcher, 108 F.
Supp. 582, 584-85 (M.D. Tenn. 1952) (upholding the separate but equal stan-
dard with respect to public golf courses).
114 Ko rematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
us Id. at 215-16.
116 Id.
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The approval, however, of legal restrictions that violated the
civil rights of a racial group was ephemeral." 7 During the 1952
term, the Supreme Court began scrutinizing the premise of the
"separate but equal" doctrine.118 The Court reviewed five cases
that contested the Plessy "separate but equal" doctrine in pub-
lic education.119 In Brown v. Board of Education,120 the court
held that "in the field of education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place."121
Even after Brown, blacks still faced discrimination through
the prohibition of interracial marriage.122 If a black person at-
tempted to marry a white person, both parties faced criminal
charges.123 It was not until 1967, in the case of Loving v.
Virginia,124 when the laws barring interracial marriage were
117 Robinson, supra note 105, at 350.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 351.
120 Bro wn v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, blacks were
seeking aid from the court in obtaining admission to public schools of their
community on a nonsegregated basis. Id. at 487. Under laws permitting or
mandating segregation, blacks were denied access to public schools attended
by whites. Id. at 488. The court ruled that segregation of public schools on
the basis of race, even though the facilities were virtually equal, deprived
blacks of equal educational opportunities. Id. at 493. The court noted that to
separate blacks from whites on the basis of race creates a feeling of inferi-
ority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely to be undone. Id.
121 Id. at 495.
122 Elizabeth Cooper, Who Needs Marriage?: Equality and the Role of the
State, 8 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 325, 326 (2006).
123 Steven Bank, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Dilemma of Symmetry:
The Understanding of Equality in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 2 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 303, 304 (1995).
124 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In Loving, Mildred Jeter and Rich-
ard Loving married in the District of Columbia. Id. at 2. Shortly after the
marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia. Id. Subsequently, the Lovings
were charged with violating a state statute banning interracial marriage. Id. at
3. The Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year
in prison. Id. The trial judge, however, suspended the sentence on the condi-
tion that the Lovings leave Virginia for 25 years. Id. This judge stated,
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declared unconstitutional.125
Opponents of the comparison between race and homosexual-
ity posit that the economic and social consequences of discrimi-
nation are much more severe for racial minorities than for
homosexuals.126 Even if the discrimination against racial minor-
ities is more severe than the discrimination against gay persons,
one still cannot deny the fact that homosexuals and racial mi-
norities have been, and continue to be, the target of purposeful
and pernicious discrimination.127 This discrimination against
homosexuals is apparent in many aspects. 128
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but
for the interference with his arrangement there would be no
cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.
Id. After their convictions, the Lovings moved to the District of Columbia.
Id. The Lovings filed a motion to vacate the judgment and set aside the sen-
tence on the ground that the statutes, which they had violated, were violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The court held that there was no doubt
that restricting the freedom to marry on the basis of racial classifications vio-
lated the essence of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 12. The court further
held that the Virginia statute was in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In so doing, the court noted that the free-
dom to marry is recognized as a vital personal right essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. Id.
125 Id.
126 Schacter, supra note 74, at 291-92. Whatever the degree of social aliena-
tion that has accompanied perceptions of homosexuality, discrimination
against homosexuals has never been as explicitly and systematically incorpo-
rated in the American legal system as has racism. Fajer, supra note, 71. The
long-term effects of anti-gay discrimination do not include a high degree of
spatial segregation nor a nearly permanent underclass. Id. In the United
States, the long-term effects of discrimination against racial minorities do en-
compass a high degree of spatial segregation and a nearly permanent under-
class. Id. at 38-39.
127 C. Brett Miller, Same-Sex Marriage: An Examination of the Issues of Due
Process and Equal Protection, 59 ARK. L. REV. 471, 499 (2006) ( noting that
the discrimination faced by gay persons is no less pernicious or intense than
the discrimination faced by other groups treated as suspect classes).
128 Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discrimi-
nating, Unwittingly, or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 937, 948 (1991). Histori-
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First, The United States has criminalized homosexual conduct
in the past.129 North Carolina's "crime against nature" had long
criminalized oral or anal sex regardless of the gender or age of
the participants and the location of the act.130 Before the
landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas,131 eight states had changed
the "crime against nature" to criminalize only same sex acts. 132
ne of the most significant cases that pertains to the criminaliza-
tion of homosexual conduct is Bowers v. Hardwick13 3 In Bow-
ers, Michael Hardwick was arrested in his own bedroom for
making love with another consenting adult and charged with
sodomy.134 Though Hardwick was not prosecuted, he filed a
federal civil rights challenge to the statute, arguing that it vio-
lated his fundamental right of privacy.'35
Writing for a majority of five, Justice White concluded that
the constitutional right of privacy did not extend to homosexual
sodomy.136 Essential to the majority's treatment of the case was
its claim that homosexual sodomy has always beenviewed as
criminal; it was a criminal offense at common law and was
criminalized by the first thirteen colonies at the time they rati-
fied the Bill of Rights .137 Justice White's opinion relied on the
asserted antiquity of proscriptions against homosexual sodomy
cally, gay persons have been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility.
Id. Discrimination against gay persons is more likely than not to reflect
deep-seated prejudice as opposed to rationality. Id.
129 Christopher Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unen-
forced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 158 (2000).
130 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 144-177 (2000). " If any person shall commit the
crime against nature, with mankind or beast, he shall be punished as a Class I
felon." Id.
131 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
132 Michael Curtis, Transforming Teenagers into Oral Sex Felons: The Persis-
tence of the Crime Against Nature After Lawrence v. Texas, 43 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 155, 158 (2008).
133 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
134 Id. at 187-88.
135 Id. at 188.
136 Id. at 191.
137 Id. at 192.
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to understand Hardwick's conduct.138 Justice White cited an-
cient proscriptions to demonstrate that the framers could not
have intended the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment
to protect Hardwick's homosexual sodomy and to support
White's view that homosexual sodomy is sinful and immoral.139
Because homosexuality is sinful and immoral, Justice White as-
serted that homosexuality is now, as it always has been, properly
punished by the criminal law.1 40
Second, homosexuals were dismissed from military service be-
cause of their sexual orientation.141 Until recently, homosexuals
were not allowed to openly serve in the military because of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT)."142 DADT, which was a fed-
eral statute and military policy, prohibited recruiters from ask-
ing individuals about their sexual orientation and prevented gay
service members from disclosing their sexual orientation
through word or deed.143 DADT barred gay service members
from (1) engaging in homosexual acts, (2) stating that they are
homosexual, or (3) marrying a person of the same sex.144 The
policy behind DADT was the proposition that permitting the
service of individuals who have an inclination to engage in ho-
mosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high
standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohe-
sion that are the essence of military capability.145
138 Id.
139 Id. at 192-93.
140 Id.
141 Paul Secunda, The Solomon Amendment: Expressive Associations, and
Public Employment, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1767, 1773 (2007).
142 Id. Law schools started denying military recruiters access to their cam-
pus. Id. These schools were loath to promote the military's policy of discrimi-
nating against homosexuals. Id. Congress reacted by enacting the Solomon
Amendment. Id. This amendment withholds certain federal funding from
colleges and universities if they deny the military recruiters access to the
campus and the students on the campus. Id.
143 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000).
144 Id.
145 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2000). In 2010, the senate repealed Don't Ask,
Don't Tell. S. 4023, 111th Cong. (2010. The repeal, however, did not take
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Third, gay persons have been victims, and continue to be vic-
tims, of a significant number of hate crimes in the United
States.146 As an example, Jamie Nabozny entered the seventh
grade and at that time he realized he was gay.147 Unfortunately,
Jamie's classmates also realized that Jamie was gay.148 Conse-
quently, Jamie was frequently called "faggot" and he was spat
upon on many occasions.149 This harassment, however, esca-
lated culminating in a physical attack during class. 50 After the
teacher stepped out of the room, two male students grabbed Ja-
mie, pushed him to the floor, held him down, and performed a
mock rape on him.1s1 No disciplinary action was taken.152 Un-
fortunately, this attack was not the only attack. Another attack
resulted in Jamie suffering internal bleeding.153
And as horrible as the attack on Jamie was, at least he lived.
Others, like Matthew Shepard, were not so fortunate. The col-
lege student was tied to a fence, beaten, and left to die on the
outskirts of Laramie, Wyoming in 1988.154
effect until the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff
certified to Congress their acceptance and the Department of Defense pro-
vided new regulations to enforce the nondiscrimination policy. Anthony
Noto, Lawrence and the Morality of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" After Lofton,
Witt, and Cook: The Law Before and After Repeal, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT
REV. 155, 160 (2010).
146 John Cohan, Parental Duties and the Right of Homosexual Minors to Re-
fuse "Reparative" Therapy, 11 BuFF. WOMEN'S L. J. 67, 71 (2002/2003). The
U.S. Department of Justice provides that gay persons are probably the most
frequent victims of hate crimes. Id. Hate crimes are crimes that are commit-
ted against a particular group. Id.
147 Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F. 3d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1996).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 452.
154 Gregory Kouki, Matthew Shepard and Hate Crimes, Stand to Reason,
http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5443 (accessed 01/10/
2013). Matthew Shepard's story has been cited by many as an illustration of
the inhumane treatment momosexuals have been subjected to in our country.
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It would be comforting to think that the attack on Matthew
Shephard and Jamie's experience were just rare, isolated
events, but unfortunately they were not.155 Gay youth are more
likely than their straight peers to be victims of violence at
school.156 The U.S. Justice Department reports that homosexu-
als are probably the most frequent victims of hate crimes.157
The Federal Bureau of Investigation maintains statistics indicat-
ing that in 2008 17.6% of the victims of hate crimes were
targeted based on their sexual orientation.158 According to the
Centers for Disease Control, one in six gay and lesbian teenag-
ers is beaten up so badly during high school that they require
medical attention.159
C. Social Stigmatization
Racial minorities have been subjected to incorrect stereotyp-
ing and social stigmatization.160 African-American men, for ex-
ample, are perceived by society as being more dangerous, more
prone to violence, and more likely to be criminals or gang mem-
bers than other members of society.161 A harsh reality is that
crime has become a metaphor to describe young black men. 162
Because blacks are seen as criminals, people generally perceive
acts to be violent when a Black person engages in these acts and
155 Theresa Bryant, May We Teach Tolerance? Establishing the Parameters
of Academic Freedom in Public Schools, 60 U. Prrr. L. REV. 579, 584 (1999).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2008/victims.
159 Bryant, supra note 151, at 854.
160 Girardeau Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 How. L. J. 611, 613 (2007).
161 Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 403 (1996). Black
women also suffer from stereotypical perceptions. Id. For example, black
women are perceived as untrustworthy, criminals, and dangerous. Id.
162 Id.
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benign when a non-Black person engages in the same acts.163
Blacks are also treated as if they are all potential thieves. *
Most blacks have been denied entry to a store, closely watched,
snubbed, questioned about their ability to pay for an item, or
stopped and detained for shoplifting.165
A stereotype that Asian Americans face is that people associ-
ate Asian Americans with foreignness. 166 This stereotype is still
evident today. 167 To illustrate, two Asian Americans, who were
associated with the O.J. Simpson trial and who spoke without a
noticeable accent, were portrayed as bumbling, heavily-accented
Asians who were unable to speak English. 168 The Asian-as-for-
eigner stereotype takes on harsh ramifications.169 In 1982, Ron-
ald Ebens and Michael Nitz, two White Detroit autoworkers,
struck Vincent Chin, a Chinese American, to death with a base-
ball bat.170 While beating Vincent, the two perpetrators called
163 Id. at 404-05. Birt Duncan tested this hypothesis on 104 White under-
graduate students. Id. at 405. The participants observed two people engaged
in a heated argument that resulted in one shoving the other. Id. After the
shove, the participants were told to rate the behavior of the person who
shoved the other person. Id. Duncan concluded that when the person shov-
ing was a Black person and the person being shoved was White, 75% of the
participants perceived the shove as violent behavior, while 6% thought the
shove was playing around. Id. at 405-06. Conversely, when participants ob-
served the same events with a White person as the shover and a Black person
as the victim, 17% thought the White person's shove was violent, while 42%
characterized the White person's shove as playing around. Id. at 406.
164 Theresa Martinez, Embracing the outlaws: Deviance at the Intersection of
Race, Class, and Gender, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 193, 198 (1994).
165 Regina Austin, A Nation of Thieves: Securing Black People's Right to
Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147, 149 (1994).
166 Lee, supra note 157, at 430.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 431.
170 Darren Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativ-
ity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 Bune. L. REV. 1, 91
(1999).
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him a "Nip" and accused him of contributing to the loss of jobs
in the automobile industry.171
Similar to Asian Americans, Latino Americans are associated
with foreignness.172 Some people also perceive Latino Ameri-
cans, if they are brown-skinned persons who speak English with
a Spanish accent, as illegal immigrants.7 3 This perception is bol-
stered if those Latino Americans are unskilled or employed as
domestic or menial laborers.174 Young male Latinos also face
another stereotype because they are assumed to be gang mem-
bers. 175 There is an ironic connection between the Latino-as-
criminal stereotype and the Latino-as-illegal immigrant stereo-
type because illegal aliens are considered lawbreakers.176
Homosexuals are subjected to equally harsh stereotypes.177
One of the most common stereotypes of homosexuals is that
they actively recruit children to homosexuality.178 Part of their
alleged strategy in this regard is presenting role models that
make homosexuality appear attractive to young children.179
This proposition, however, has no basis in fact.180 To elucidate,
homosexuals do not attempt to convert children, nor will expo-
sure to a gay person affect a child's sexual orientation.' 8 ' Sexual
171 Id. Ebens and Nitz pleaded guilty to manslaughter and were given light
sentences of three years probation and fines of $3,780. Hutchinson, supra
notel70,. at 91-92. The United States Department of Justice, however, prose-
cuted the defendants for violating Chin's civil rights. Id. at 92. Ebens was
convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years, and Nitz was acquitted. Id.
Ebens' conviction was overturned and he was subsequently acquitted. Id.
172 Lee, supra note 161, at 441.
173 Id. at 442.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 443.
176 Id.
177 Harris Miller II, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 797, 821 (1984).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.at 822.
181 Id.
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orientation is established early in life and cannot be consciously
acquired.182
The most offensive stereotype is that homosexuals are more
likely to molest children than are heterosexuals.183 Officials
used this misperception to justify sodomy statutes and employ-
ment discrimination.18 4 In fact, the average homosexual is
neither likely to molest children nor more likely than a hetero-
sexual to be a child molester. 85
Another stereotype is that homosexuals are mentally ill.186
Because people think that homosexuality is a mental disease,
there is an idea that homosexuals are inferior or unstable. 87
The reality is that homosexuals who have come to terms with
their homosexuality are no more distressed psychologically than
are heterosexuals.188 Homosexuality is not indicative of
psychopathology.189
182 Id.
183 Timothy Lin, Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the
Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 774
(1999).
184 Pamela Jablow, Victims of Abuse and Discrimination: Protecting Battered
Homosexuals Under Domestic Violence Legislation, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1095, 1131 (2000).
185 Clifford Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and
the Gender of Homophobia, 20 Yale J. L. & Feminism, 257, 320 (2009). Em-
pirical data shows that homosexuals are the least likely persons to sexually
abuse children and that children are more likely to be sexually abused by
heterosexuals than by homosexuals. Id. Social science research demonstrates
that the great majority of child sexual abuse is committed by heterosexual
men as opposed to lesbians or gay men. Id. Another review of the social
science literature provides that the vast majority of sex crimes committed by
adults on children are heterosexual, not homosexual. Id.
186 Miller, supra note 177, at 823.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 822-24.
189 Jablow, Supra notel94, at 1131. Sex researcher Magnus Hirschfield de-
scribed homosexuality as a normal variation of human sexuality. Id. Mental
health professionals adopted this proposition. Id. Mental Health profession-
als were prompted to remove homosexuality from the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders in
1973. Id.
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D. Political Powerless
To determine whether a group is politically powerless, courts
must ascertain whether a particular group is respected in our
nation's legislatures.190 Put another way, courts must determine
whether a group's interests are fully taken into account in the
majoritarian process.191 The political powerlessness of a group
is indicative of "a social and cultural isolation that gives the ma-
jority little reason to respect or be concerned with that group's
interests and needs."192
For centuries, legislatures have not respected racial minorities
and the majoritarian process has not taken into account the in-
terests of these racial minorities.193 The lack of respect of the
legislature is evident by the fact that blacks have faced a history
of invidious discrimination.194 By example, de jure segregation
has been on the books for centuries.195 It was accepted that
blacks and whites were not allowed to drink from the same
water fountains,196 blacks and whites were not allowed to sit on
190 Courtney Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political
Power of LGBTs as a Basis for the Court's Application of Heightened Scru-
tiny, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 385, 390 (2010).
19' Id.
192 Id. See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.
24 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193 Keith Bybee, The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 34 LAW & Soc'y 263, 280 (2000). See also United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). The court stated
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes or-
dinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." Id.
194 Louis Henkin, De Funis: An Introduction, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 483, 486
(1975). As a result of our society being filled with adverse racial DISCRIMI-
NATION and not yet purged of INVIDIOUS racial practices and attitudes, it is
necessary that all racial classifications are suspect requiring close judicial
scrutiny. Id.
195 Richard Epstein, A Rational Basis for Affirmative Action: A Shaky but
Classical Liberal Defense, 100 MIcH. L. REV. 2036, 2046 (2002).
196 James Blumstein, Shaw v. Reno and Miller v. Johnson: Where we are and
Where we are Headed, 26 CumB. L. REV. 503, 506 (1995-1996).
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the same bus,197 and blacks and whites were not allowed to oc-
cupy the same classroom,198 Courts have also affirmed the ban
on interracial marriage, 199 restrictive covenants,200 and the pre-
clusion of blacks from sitting on the jury.201
Other racial minorities have been disrespected by the legisla-
ture.202 Japanese Americans, for example, were excluded from
occupying a particular part of the country and were subject to a
curfew.203 More recently, racial minorities could have faced an
unreasonable search at any time in Arizona.204 Anyone sus-
pected of being an illegal immigrant could have been compelled
to show a photo identification.205
Homosexuals, in comparison, are not respected by the legisla-
ture, and their interests are not taken into account by the
majoritarian process.206 It is axiomatic that homosexuals have
suffered social isolation.207 One cannot dispute the fact that in
the past homosexuals have been deemed mentally ill, and many
people continue to believe that homosexuality is morally repre-
hensible.208 These beliefs were adopted by states when intimate
conduct between gay persons was considered a crime through-
out our nation's history.209 Throughout our nation's history,
homosexuals were not given the right to marry the person of
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Paris v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948) (en banc).
200 Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W. 2d 679 (Mo. 1946) (en banc).
201 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
202 Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51
UCLA L. Rev. 933, 939 (2004).
203 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1943).
204 L. Darnell Weeden, It is Discriminatory for Arizona or Society to Engage
in the Anti-Immigration Practice of Profiling Hispanics for Speaking Spanish,
12 Loy. J. PUB. INr. L. 109, 120-21 (2010).
205 Id.
206 Powers, supra note 190, at 391.
207 Id. at 390.
208 Id. at 390-91.
209 Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A. 2d 407, 444 (Conn. 2008).
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their choice in a significant number of states,210 permitted to
adopt children,211 or allowed to enter the military.212
It is even more apparent that homosexuals were not respected
by the legislature when there was a law on the books that barred
the adoption of anti-discrimination laws against individuals
based on their sexual orientation. 213 The most recent example
of the lack of respect in the legislature comes from Mike Reyn-
olds, a representative in Oklahoma. 214 Mr. Reynolds is pushing
a bill in Oklahoma that would bar homosexuals from openly
serving in the state's national guard.215
Courts have also considered the direct representation of mi-
norities in our government in determining whether a group is
politically powerless.216 Racial minorities were substantially un-
derrepresented in Congress and state legislatures.217 Although
there was a national voting age population of 11.1% black, they
constituted 4.9% of members of Congress and 5.4% of all state
legislators.218 Despite the fact that there was a national voting
age population of 7.3% Hispanic, they made up 2.5% of Con-
gress and 1.7% of state legislators.219 Since the 1990 Census,
state legislatures and federal and state courts adopted new redis-
tricting plans producing some of the largest increases in minority
210 Id.
211 Linda Lacey, " 0 Wind, Remind Him that I Have no Children": Infertility
and Feminist Jurisprudence, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 176 (1998).
212 Elaine Donnelly, Constructing the Co-Ed Military, 14 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL'Y 815, 900-01 (2007).
213 Romer v. Evans, 15 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996).
214 Neal Broverman, Okla. Lawmaker Wants Gays Barred from National
Guard, The Advocate, (Jan. 10, 2012), ww.advocate.com. See also DADT
Would Return to Oklahoma National Guard under Mike Reynolds' Proposed
Bill, The Huffington Post, (Jan. 10, 2012), www.huffingtonpost.com/. . ./
OKLAHOMA-dadt-NATIONAL-GUARD-MIKE-REY.
215 Id.
216 Powers, supra note 190, at 391.
217 Frank Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting: A Critique of
Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
218 Id.
219 Id.
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representation.220 Irrespective of these gains, minority represen-
tation in Congress and state legislatures did not surpass the mi-
nority population percentages and still failed to provide
proportional representation. 221
Homosexuals are also underrepresented in our govern-
ment.2 2 2 It is estimated that there are about five to ten percent
of homosexuals in this country.223 There were three openly gay
members in the 111th Congress.224
One cannot dispute the immense benefits that flow from hav-
ing gay representation in our legislative bodies. 225 The presence
of openly gay legislators creates respect for homosexuals within
that legislative body.2 2 6 The greater the number of openly gay
representatives serving in a legislative body, the more opportu-
nities there are for non-gay legislators to interact with homosex-
uals and gain a better understanding of the gay community.227
Another benefit of having openly gay legislatures is they are
motivated to champion legislation, specifically designed to bene-
fit and protect the gay community. 228 The reason is openly gay
legislatures have a direct understanding of the experience and
220 Id.
221 Id. at 3.
222 Powers, supra note 186, at 395.
223 Id. at 389.
224 Id. at 392.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts sponsored the Em-
ployment Non-Discrimination Act. Id. This act proposes to extend federal
employment discrimination protections to include discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity. Id. Representative Tammy Baldwin
of Wisconsin has also sponsored the Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obli-
gations Act. Id. This act would require the federal government to provide
the same benefits to its LGBT civilian employees as those already provided
to its employees with different-sex spouses. Id. Tammy Baldwin has also
introduced the Ending Health Disparities for LGBT Americans Act. Id. This
act is designed to make the nation's health care system more equitable for
LGBTs. Id.
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needs of the gay community. 229 Openly gay legislators are also
more likely to identify the impact of legislation, which on its
face, does not specifically address the gay community.230 This is
vital because non-gay legislators are less cognizant of and sensi-
tive to the needs and concerns of the gay community.231
E. Ability To Contribute To Society
Research provides support for the proposition that race bears
no relation to a person's ability to participate and contribute to
society.232 This proposition is evident in the fact that blacks
comprise ten percent of the workforce.233 Based on 1990 Census
figures, there are approximately 425,000 Black-owned busi-
nesses.234 Other blacks who do not own their businesses hold
positions of physicians, 235 lawyers,236 accountants, 237 college
professors, 238 structural metal workers,239 and firefighters. 240
229 Id.
230 Id. The health care debate during the 111th Congress, for example, did
not explicitly address the rights of homosexuals. Id. at 393. The reason was
the objective was to reform the system and expand insurance coverage for all
Americans. Id. Tammy Baldwin, however, led an effort in the House to
amend its health care reform legislation to: (1) assist people with AIDS in
accessing drugs under Medicare; and (2) include data collection on the health
of homosexuals. Id.
231 Id. at 393.
232 Justin Schwartz, A Not Quite Color-Blind Constitution: Racial Discrimi-
nation and Racial Preference in Justice O'Connor's "Newest" Equal Protec-
tion Jurisprudence, 58 OHIO Sr. L. J. 1055, 1059 (1997).
233 Tung Yin, A Carbolic Smoke Ball for the Nineties: Class-Based Affirma-
tive Action, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 213, 237 (1997).
234 Schwartz, supra note 229, at 1058 n. 14.
235 Id. at 1058 n. 13.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 1058 n. 12.
240 Id.
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In 1998, African Americans and Hispanics made up 12.5% of
all professionals.241 This percentage includes 14.3% of account-
ants,2 4 2 9.7% of physicians,243 9.4% of college and university
teachers,244 and 7.9% of engineers. 2 4 5 African Americans and
Hispanics also made up 7%of lawyers,246 4.8 %of dentists, 2 4 7 and
6.9%of natural scientists.248
Racial minorities participate in society in a number of other
ways. For example, African Americans and Hispanics hold pub-
lic elective offices.249 Despite holding public offices, racial mi-
norities live, go to school, play, and worship in the same way as
European Americans.250 Racial minorities are also similar to
European Americans because racial minorities pay taxes,2 5 1 get
married,252 and raise their families. 253
Similarly, significant case law provides support for the notion
that sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual's abil-
ity to participate and contribute to society.254 This proposition is
241 Jodey Roure, Achieving Educational Equity and Access to Under-
represented Students in the Legal Profession, 19 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L.
REV. 31, 34 (2009).
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1292 (1989).
250 Colin S. Diver, From Equality to Diversity: The Detour From Brown to
Grutter, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 712 (2004).
251 Beverly Moran, Setting An Agenda for the Study of Tax and Black Cul-
ture, 21 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 779, 793 (1999).
252 Regina Austin, Nest Eggs and Stormy Weather: Law, Culture, and Black
Women's Lack of Wealth, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 761 (1997).
253 Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial
Discrimination: Lessons From Post-Katrina New Orleans, 60 CATH. U. L.
REV. 661, 703 (2011).
254 See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862, 890 (Iowa 2009). The court
noted that none of the same-sex marriage decisions from other state courts
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essential to courts' analysis.255 Legislation treating LGBTs dif-
ferently is often motivated by prejudice or an inaccurate stereo-
type even when there is no real difference in the ability of
homosexuals compared to heterosexuals. 256
By example, there is no real difference between children
raised by gay parents than children raised by straight parents.257
Overall, studies show that the differences between children
raised by homosexuals and those raised by heterosexuals are
few.258 Specifically, researchers find no detrimental effect to a
child as a result of the child being raised by one or more homo-
sexual parent. 259 Further research provides that there is no dif-
have found a person's SEXUAL ORIENTATION to be indicative of the person's
ability to participate in and CONTRIBUTE to SOCIETY. Id. The court further
noted that Iowa's legislature declared as the public policy of the state that
homosexuality is not relevant to a person's ability to contribute to a number
of societal institutions other than civil marriage. Id. at 390-91.
255 Id.
256 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
Typically, a classification immaterial to a person's ability to contribute to so-
ciety reflects prejudice and antipathy. Id. There is an assumption that those
in the burdened group are not as worthy or deserving as others. Id. These
classifications also reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of
persons in this burdened class. Id.
257 Clifford Rosky, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the Future of Same-Sex
Marriage Law, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 913, 945 (2011). See also Nancy Levit, The-
orizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 Colum. J. Gender
& L. 21, 54 (2010).
258 Heather Latham, Desperately Clinging to the Cleavers: What Family Law
Courts are Doing about Homosexual Parents, and What Some are Refusing to
See, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 223, 233 (2005).
259 Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uni-
form Parentage Act, 16 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 163, 219 (2007). Numerous
professional groups and many research studies have concluded that having
GAY PARENTS is not DETRIMENTAL to a CHILD'S mental health or social func-
tioning. Id. The American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy
of Family Physicians, the Child Welfare League of America, the National As-
sociation of Social Workers, and the American Psychological Association
have all found that homosexual parents are "just as good" as heterosexual
parents, and that "children thrive in gay- and lesbian-headed families." Id. at
219-20.
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ference in the development, 260 mental health,261 and
psychological stability of a child parented by gay parents and
one parented by straight parents.262 Furthermore, children
raised by gay parents have been found to exhibit impressive psy-
chological strength.263
There is also no difference between homosexuals' and heter-
osexuals' ability to serve in the military.264 More specifically,
there is no visible_ data supporting the conclusion that gays and
lesbians cannot acceptably serve in the military.265 In fact, a sig-
nificant number of gays have served and continue to serve in the
military with distinction.266 Studies show that homosexuals not
only serve in the military, but most of them do so without inci-
dent and receive honorable discharges at the conclusion of their
service.26 7
Although there is no difference between homosexuals and
heterosexuals, people still find reasons to condemn gays irre-
spective of the fact that gays work, 268 pay taxes,269 vote,270 hold
260 Latham, supra note 255, at 233.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 C. Dixon Osburn, A Policy in Desperate Search of a Rationale: The Mili-
tary's Policy on Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals, 64 UMKC L. REV. 199, 207
(1995). The United States military has never argued that lesbians, gays and
bisexuals could not physically or mentally perform military duties as effec-
tively as heterosexuals. Id. The Defense Personnel Security Research and
Education Center prepared a study for the military affirming that having a
same-gender or an opposite-gender orientation is immaterial to job perform-
ance in the same way as is being left- or right-handed. Id. The most compre-
hensive study ever conducted for the military concerning gay and lesbian
servicemembers in 1993 refused to address homosexuals' ability to perform
because it was not significant. Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Troy Holroyd, Homosexuals and the Military: Integration or Discrimina-
tory, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 429, 449 (1992).
268 Snetsinger v. Montana University System, 325 Mont. 148, 164 (2004).
269 Id.
270 Id.
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public office,2 71 own businesses,272 provide professional ser-
vices,273 worship, 274 raise their families and serve their communi-
ties in the same manner as heterosexuals. 275 With respect to the
workplace, there is no evidence that homosexuals are any less
qualified, reliable, or productive employees than heterosexu-
als.2 7 6 This is especially evident in the teaching context where
researchers found that male undergraduates who evaluated
homosexuals concluded that gay teachers were not less qualified
than straight teachers and these gay teachers were likely to suc-
ceed in the classroom.277 There are reservations as to whether
the decisions to remove gay teachers from teaching positions
can be supported on grounds that their presence disrupts the
school environment.278
To supplement the reasoning so far, we can learn from the
experience of our closest neighbor as it has struggled with the
same question, using a very similar framework of analysis. Ca-
nada has, in many regards, the same kind of individualistic cul-
tural tradition that fuels so much of American jurisprudence. In
addition, it has an analogous history of disparate treatment of
those with a preference for same-sex partners.
III. THE CANADIAN TREATMENT OF SAME SEX COUPLES
AND STRICT SCRUTINY
While the laws of other countries are not in any way binding
on the interpretation of the United States Constitution, examin-
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Sharon Portwood, Employment Discrimination in the Public Sector Based
on Sexual Orientation: Conflicts Between Research Evidence and the Law, 19
LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 113, 126 (1995).
278 The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Sus-
pect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1307 (1985).
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ing what thoughtful judges in other countries have done can of-
fer perspectives to help our justices in their interpretations279.
The more similar the questions being considered and the more
similar the laws in question, the more useful the examination.
Studying what has happened in other jurisdictions can also help
judges foresee some of the consequences a particular interpreta-
tion might have in our country. Again, the more similar the laws
at issue and the nation to whose jurisprudence we look, the
more useful is the examination of legal evolution of a particular
legal principle. Examining what other countries do also helps us
to see where the values being protected in our nation are in con-
flict or are consistent with the global moral climate.
The expansion of equal protection for homosexuals reflects a
changing moral climate worldwide. One striking example is the
growing number of nations providing equal protection for
homosexuals with respect to protecting their right to marry a
partner of the sex of their choice. 280
As justices in this nation consider the standard of scrutiny we
apply to homosexuals under the Equal Protection Clause, it may
be instructive for them to consider how the Canadians approach
the equal protection of homosexuals under their Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, which serves the same function as our
Constitution in protecting individual rights. Examining how
Canadians have extended equal protection to homosexuals may
279 As Justice Breyer explained, if something has been written "by a man or
a woman who has a job like mine in another country, and who is interpreting
a document somewhat like mine and who in fact has a problem in front of the
Court somewhat like mine, why can't I read it, see what they've done? I
might learn something." Justice Breyer on the Role of International Law,
Justice Watch, < http://afjjusticewatch.blogspot.com/2010/04/justice-breyer-
on-role-of-international.html> April 1, 2010.
280 The first nation to recognize same sex marriage was the Netherlands, in ,
followed by Belguim in 2003, Spain and Canada in 2005, South Africa in
2006,Norway and Sweden in 2009, Portugal in 2010,Iceland and Argentina in
2010.The Washington Post.com<available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/specialreports/countries-where-same-sex-marriage-is-legal/2012/05/10/
glQAwOziFU-gallery.html#photo=2>
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be extremely valuable because Canada and the United States
share cultural, social, economic and political traditions.281 In-
deed, according to Card and Freeman, "few countries offer a
more natural pairing for evaluating policies and institutions or
for uncovering the reasons for differences in outcomes than the
United States and Canada."282
Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
provides that "every individual is equal before and under the
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit
of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without dis-
crimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, color, relig-
ion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." The purpose of
this provision is:
"[T]o prevent the violation of essential human dignity and
freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping,
or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in
which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human be-
ings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and
equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration." 283
One could see this purpose as being similar to the purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Only when the law in question conflicts with this purpose will
it be found to be in violation of the Charter. When analyzing
whether a law conflicts with the charter, a three step test is used
to determine the existence of a violation.284 The steps are
whether a discriminatory distinction is formed, whether the
claimant is subject to differential treatment as a product of that
281 For a detailed discussion of these similarities, see generally, Christy Glass
& Nancy Kubasek, The Evolution of Same-Sex Marriage in Canada: Lessons
the U.S. Can Learn From their Northern Neighbor Regarding Same-Sex Mar-
riage Rights, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 143 (2008).
282 David Card & Richard B. Freeman, Small Differences That Matter: Ca-
nada vs. The United States, in Working Under Different Rules 189, 191
(Richard B. Freeman ed., 1993).
283 Halpern v. Canada (2003) (OR 2d)1, 60.
284 Law v. Canada, (1998), (1999) 1 S.C.R., 497 (S.C.C.)
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distinction, and whether the differential treatment discriminates,
by imposing a burden upon or withholding a benefit from the
claimant in a way that makes the claimant be viewed as less ca-
pable or worthy of recognition as a human being or Canadian
citizen.285
In the case of Halpern v. Canada, the claimants include seven
same sex couples who sought to become married. Applications
were filed with the Toronto Clerk's office, which while not deny-
ing the applications, applied to the courts for direction and held
the applications in abeyance. While these applications were in
abeyance, the Metropolitan Community Church of Toronto per-
formed ceremonies solemnizing the marriages of a number of
same sex couples. Applications for these marriages were filed
with the Office of the Registrar General, who denied the appli-
cations, stating that federal law prohibited same sex marriages.
After this denial, the Metropolitan Community Church filed an
action in the Divisional court, which was consolidated with the
applications of the parties with filings in abeyance. The court
eventually ruled that a denial of marriage to same sex couples
constituted a violation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
which resulted in an expansion of the definition of marriage to
include same sex couples.
The first step in determining a law's compliance with the char-
ter is to determine either that the law draws a formal distinction
between the claimant and other persons based on one or more
personal characteristics, or that the law fails to take into account
the already disadvantaged position of the claimant within Cana-
dian Society that has resulted in substantially differential treat-
ment on the basis of one or more personal characteristics.286
When determining whether a law is in compliance with this
first step is to determine whether or not a distinction is made by
the law in question. It is not necessary that the law create the
285 Id.
286 Halpern O.R. at 17
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discriminatory effect that is the source of the claimants harmbut
rather simply that the law has somehow made a potentially dis-
criminatory distinction between the group in which the claimant
belongs and the remainder of Canadian society.287
A formal distinction was found to have been in limiting the
definition of marriage as being between a man and a
woman.288As a consequence of the Canadian government giving
legal recognition to marriage and a series of rights and obliga-
tions surrounding that institution, denial of access to those rights
and obligations constitutes a formal distinction between same-
sex and opposite-sex couples. 289 The court concludes that the
common law definition of marriage has created a distinction that
satisfies the first condition of a 15(1) Charter inquiry.
The second step in a 15(1) Charter inquiry is to determine
whether or not the claimant experienced differential treatment
based on an enumerated or analogous ground290 that would be
protected under the Charter. Case law has clearly enumerated
that sexual orientation does in fact qualify as an analogous
ground. 291 The court in Egan referred to sexual orientation as a
"deeply personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or
changeable only at unacceptable personal costs". Because the
laws discriminating against same sex couples are treating a class
287 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493
288 Halpern O.R.2d at 18-19.
289 Halpern O.R.2d at 19. The court then argues by analogy that denial of
marriage on a religious or racial ground would definitely consist of a discrimi-
natory distinction, which suggests that the Canadian courts are putting dis-
criminatory distinction based on sexual orientation on the same level as
discriminatory distinction against groups that in the United States would
have the protection strict judicial scrutiny.
290 An enumerated ground is any that is explicitly listed within the charter as
a protected group, while analogous groups are any of those who are pro-
tected, but not specifically listed in the charted. Race, national or ethnic ori-
gin, color, religion, sex, and age or mental or physical disability are the
current enumerated grounds in the Charter
291 Egan v. Canada, (1995), (1995) 2 S.C.R. 513
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of persons differently based on an analogous ground, the second
step in the inquiry has been satisfied.
The third step in performing an inquiry into whether a partic-
ular piece of law violates the charter of rights and freedoms is to
determine whether discrimination has indeed occurred. When
making this determination, the court looks to the substantive
equality, not simply formal equality.292 "When we are looking
to see if discrimination exists, we are seeking to preserve the
human dignity of those who could be affected by the law." 2 93
When making the decision as to whether or not the discrimina-
tion would violate the human dignity of a class or persons, the
Canadian court looks to whether or not a reasonable person
with the particular group's traits and history would find the dif-
ferentiation in the law demeaning to their dignity.294
In Law v. Canada,_ court outlined four different factors for a
claimant to reference in coming to a determination as to
whether or not the human dignity of the claimant has been vio-
lation. These factors are: (1) the preexistent disadvantages or
vulnerabilities of the claimant class, (2) the connection between
the grounds and the actual needs and circumstances of the
claimant, (3) whether the law in question benefits an even worse
off class of persons that the class of the claimant, and (4) the
nature of the effected interest."
In regards to the first factor, Canadian courts give this factor
the most weight, but do not go so far as to claim that it is deter-
minative of discrimination having occurred. 295 Canadian courts
give this factor significant weight, as a law that discriminates
against an already disadvantaged group has serious potential to
expand the disparate effect that the previous discrimination has
292 Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84
293 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1999 1 SCR
497
294 Id. at 533-534.
295 Id.
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inflicted.296 In regards specifically to the homosexual commu-
nity, Canadian courts have determined that evidence of such
historical discrimination and disadvantage is both widely recog-
nized and documented. 297 This evidence of discrimination is not
only prevalent, but demonstrates that the discrimination is pre-
sent throughout the professional, public, and in private affairs,
having potentially negative effects on all aspects of a person's
life who is a member of the homosexual community. 298 Due to
this widespread documentation of historical discrimination, the
first factor laid out in Law, is weighed heavily towards homosex-
uals being a class of persons in need of legal protections.
The second factor, the connection between the discriminatory
grounds and the needs of the claimant, addresses whether or not
the law in question operates to benefit the class in question. A
law that accommodates the needs and capacities of the class in
question is less likely to have a demeaning effect on that particu-
lar class of persons.299 It is difficult to assert that the denial of
the right to marry to the homosexual community is somehow to
the benefit of the homosexual community. When arguing in
favor of a law that denied marriage to homosexual couples in
Halpern, the Associated Gospel Churches of Canada (AGC) ar-
gued that law existed to serve the needs of heterosexual couples.
It was argued that heterosexual couples were benefited by the
fact that limiting marriage to only heterosexual couples would
"facilitate, shelter and nurture the unique union of a man and
woman who, together, have the possibility to bear children from
their relationship and shelter them within it"300 The court was
quick to dismiss this claim however, stating that just because a
law may benefit one social group, we look to whether or not the
group discriminated against is the one whose needs are ad-
296 Id.
297 Egan 2. S.C.R. at 600-602.
298 Id.
299 Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, 1997 1 SCR 241
300 Halpern O.R.2d at 24.
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dressed when analyzing the second factor of the test laid out in
Law.3 0 1 Because the claimant class receives no benefit from
marriage prohibiting legislation, Canadian courts have found
that the second factor of the discrimination analysis indicates
that discrimination against the homosexual community exists.
The third factor of the analysis is whether or not the legisla-
tion benefits a class or classes of persons who are in some way
worse off than the claimant's class. In Halpern, the respondent
asserted that there is a negative impact on heterosexual couples
by expanding the definition of marriage to include homosexual
couples.302 This argument was quickly dismissed by the court
however, based on the aforementioned discrimination that ho-
mosexual persons have historically been subject to, and that no
discrimination to the same extent has been experienced by het-
erosexual couples3os Furthermore, the respondent failed to
produce evidence of a particular disadvantage that was unique
to heterosexual married couples that would put them at a disad-
vantage in comparison to homosexual couples.304 Overall, this
factor did not undermine the findings of discrimination that
were present throughout the rest of the analysis.
Finally, when making an analysis as to whether discrimination
exists, the courts look at the nature of the alleged discrimina-
tion. The more severe the effect is, and the more localized the
effect that occurs, the more likely that the discrimination will be
of the sort in violation of the Charter.305 An inability to benefit
from certain legislation and economic detriment demonstrate
that discrimination exists. In determining whether discrimina-
tion exists, however, we do not simply look at potential eco-
nomic damage, but we also look to impact on the individual
from a personal and societal perspective. Factors such as
301 Law 1 S.C.R. at 538.
302 Halpern O.R.2d at 26.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Egan 2. S.C.R. at 556.
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whether the discrimination denies access to a fundamental social
institution or whether the discrimination completely fails to rec-
ognize a particular group can be considered by the court in this
analysis.306 In Halpern, it was found that denial of access to
marriage to homosexual couples rose to this level of discrimina-
tion under the argument that it was in fact denial of access to a
fundamental social institution.3o7
Since Halpern, which was a provincial case, was decided, nine
other provinces in Canada used the same mode of analysis to
provide equal protection for homosexuals and struck down laws
prohibiting same sex marriage across Canada. Ultimately, the
Canadian government passed legislation recognizing that equal
protection required equal treatment of same sex couple with re-
spect to the right to marry.
IV. CONCLUSION
A careful examination of the treatment and characteristics
laid out in this article demonstrates that legislations affecting the
rights of homosexuals should be subject to strict scrutiny, the
same level of scrutiny applicable to racial minorities. Parts II
and III of the article demonstrated that laws that discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation should be subject to the stan-
dard of strict scrutiny, as homosexuals clearly meet the stan-
dards for being a suspect class. Like racial minorities, sexual
orientation is an immutable characteristic308 , and homosexuals
are a discrete and insular minority309, have been subject to a his-
tory of discrimination3lo, have been subjected to social stigmati-
zation3ll, and have been politically powerless312. Just as race
306 Id.
307 Halpern O.R.2d at 28.
308 Supra notes 47- 54 and accompanying text.
309 Supra notes 54 - 89 and accompanying text.
310 Supra notes 90 -158 and accompanying text.
311 Supra notes 137 -166 and accompanying text.
312 Supra notes 167 -209 and accompanying text.
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bears no relationship to a person's ability to contribute to soci-
ety, one's sexual orientation likewise bears no such
relationship.313
Examining how our closest neighbor, Canada, provides equal
protection for homosexuals further strengthens support for the
case that we should apply strict scrutiny to legislation that dis-
criminates against individuals based on their sexual orientation.
And, as we observe the consequences of providing a heightened
level of scrutiny for this group in Canada, and we see that their
society has not suffered any adverse consequences as a result,
we can be more confident that this heightened level of scrutiny
would not lead to harmful consequences in our country.
The foregoing analysis clearly illustrates the analogous situa-
tion of racial minorities and homosexuals in terms of the form of
vulnerability that courts seek to protect when they designate a
group as a suspect classification. In light of this strong analogy,
just as the laws affecting the fundamental rights of racial minori-
ties are entitled to strict scrutiny, so should laws adversely af-
fecting the fundamental rights of homosexuals.
313 Supra notes 210 -256 and accompanying text.
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